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Abstract 
The target of our research is focused on the measurement of the impact of a Country Governance Index and of a Corpo-
rate Productivity Index on the total annual investment returns of stocks of a large sample of European Industrial Com-
panies from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2008. The authors take into account an innovative database of observa-
tions of corporations belonging to a large number of European euro and not euro countries. In order to achieve this 
target, the paper juxtaposes the Fama and French (1992, 1993) three factors model, with the studies of Doidge et al. 
(2007) and Gompers et al. (2003), analyzing governance and the index suggested by Parhizgari and Aburachis (2003) 
in order to measure the impact of corporate productivity on stock returns. Empirical evidence suggests that the Country 
Governance Index is negatively correlated with the total annual investment return of stocks of the listed industrial 
companies of our sample, meanwhile the more productive firms are characterized by higher stock returns. 
Keywords: stock returns, corporate governance, productivity. 
JEL Classification: G10, G34, J24. 
Introduction
Corporate finance literature has devoted much effort 
in analyzing stock returns and implementing models 
that are able to forecast their future yields on the 
stock exchanges; indeed, the different purposes of 
these forecasts animate the economic activity and 
perspectives of countries and corporations. A cor-
rect and accurate determination of the equity cost is 
necessary for various reasons, ranging from corpo-
rate issues, like capital budgeting or optimal finan-
cial structure, to market issues, like asset allocation, 
portfolio management or financial trading. Notwith-
standing this relevant volume of related studies, 
stock returns’ forecasts continue to face severe theo-
retical challenges. Hence, this issue is one of the 
most challenging and evergreen “financial puzzle” 
ever analyzed. 
According to a recent survey of Subrahmanyam 
(2010) the financial literature on cross-sectional 
expected stock returns may be usefully summarized 
according to different approaches. The first of them, 
the neoclassical approach like the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965) (he-
reafter CAPM), or the Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
(Ross, 1976) (henceforth APT), would consist in the 
first hypothesis against which we test different in-
novative approaches developed by the financial 
literature afterwards. These different neoclassical 
approaches detect a linear relation between risk and 
returns1, where the CAPM represents a single mar-
ket risk and the APT focuses its attention on differ-
ent macroeconomic factors of risk. Both models 
                                                     
 Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini, Davide Romelli, Emiliano Sironi, 2011. 
1 Theory has clearly showed that markets correctly price the risk con-
nected with the covariance and not the one arising from the variance of 
different securities composing investors’ portfolio, because of the risk 
minimizing effect of diversification. 
mainly consider a deeply connected notion of risk to 
state macroeconomic variables. The theoretical 
“Roll critique” (1977) and the empirical analysis of 
the poor performances of neoclassical models test-
ing2 (Black, Jensen and Scholes, 1972; Fama and 
MacBeth, 1973; Roll and Ross, 1980; Chen et al., 
1986) have severely weakened the CAPM-APT 
neoclassical approach. 
A second approach draws its inspiration and it roots 
in the analysis of firm fundamentals or in the current 
wisdom of practitioners. This point of view has been 
historically documented by Graham and Dodd 
(1934) observation about the virtue of the ratio of 
price to earning in predicting stock returns and has 
been successively developed by Basu (1977) and by 
Banz (1981), who displayed the existence of a size 
effect in stock returns. Harris and Gurel (1986) find 
a consistent premium in stock returns for firms that 
have been included in S&P 500, meanwhile Chan et 
al. (1991) give evidence to the same size effect in 
explaining the returns of the Japanese stocks in the 
period of 1971-1988. A relevant stimulus to this 
second approach has been received by the studies of 
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, and 1996). The 
two authors summarize the previous literature and 
demonstrate that some firm fundamentals, like the 
ratio of price to earnings, market capitalization or 
price to book value are much more capable of pro-
ducing accurate stock returns forecasts than the 
neoclassical models. Indeed, these would be proxies 
or shadow indicators of state macroeconomic va-
riables, even if financial literature does not provide 
a full comprehension of which state variables are 
these firm fundamentals shadow variables of Fama 
                                                     
2 These empirical tests that point out a much weaker relation between 
risk and return in comparison to theoretical assumptions, have been 
implemented on almost exclusively American stock returns data, begin-
ning since the 1930’s. 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 8, Issue 4, 2011
21
and French (2002). A third approach conciliates the 
previous described approaches with the attention to 
institutional features, modelled by variables like 
accounting standards (Frankel and Lee, 1998), in-
vestment policy (Titman et al., 2004), shareholders 
protection quality (La Porta et al., 1998; Gianetti 
and Koskinen, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003; Doidge 
et al., 2007) and the impact of productivity on stock 
returns (Parhizgari and Aburachis, 2003). 
In this framework, our research represents a further 
and original contribution to the existing literature 
due to different reasons: first of all, we analyze Eu-
ropean data; surveys on global stock returns are 
presented in literature (Hou et al., 2011) but a com-
parative stock return analysis on continental Europe 
as a whole has not been achievable, mainly due to 
the lack of data, particularly in Eastern European 
countries until the end of the last century. While the 
establishment and the following enlargement of the 
European Union (that represents an important step 
toward a more well conceived European integra-
tion), made it partially possible to consider the Eu-
ropean Union as a block of countries, with the intro-
duction of a larger political and economic area. 
Furthermore, from a methodological point of view, 
our study is placed in the Fama and French theoreti-
cal framework and is interested in measuring the 
impact of a Country Governance Index and of a 
Corporate Productivity Index on total annual in-
vestment returns of stocks. Hence, our research 
matches this approach with an evolution of the pre-
vious mentioned studies of Gompers et al. (2003) 
and Doidge et al. (2007) with respect to governance 
and of Parhizgari and Aburachis (2003) with respect 
to productivity. The strategy of the paper consists in 
adding a Corporate Productivity Index and a Corpo-
rate Governance Index as control variables to a Fa-
ma and French model, jointly to other additional 
explanatory variables at firm level. In this frame-
work, we remark that while Doidge et al. (2007) and 
Gompers et al. (2003) try to highlight the existence 
of a premium for good corporate governance, in this 
paper we take into account the impact of a Gover-
nance Index measured at country level on the stock 
returns of industrial companies for the whole Euro-
pean Union sample. 
Although the existent literature gives evidence that 
these variables are in broad terms “second best con-
ditions” (Arnone et al., 2006) in determining stock 
returns, they appear more important for Europe, 
than for not European economic areas. Consequent-
ly, the European countries are characterized by a 
great variety of European Commercial Codes, and a 
Corporate Governance Index is not available for all 
the listed corporations of the sample. Therefore, we 
construct a Country Governance Index elaborated 
by the Heritage Foundation, that is a partially substi-
tute for a Corporate Governance Index (Aggarwal et 
al., 2010). Moreover, we introduce in our model a 
Corporate Productivity Index. Productivity is likely 
to be a crucial economic ingredient for the European 
area that suffers a weaker growth dynamic in com-
parison with others world regions. 
This research is organized as follows. After the in-
troductory presentation of theoretical literature, this 
research develops the following issues: section 1 
focuses its attention on data and methodology, sec-
tion 2 describes the estimation strategy. Section 3 
implements an empirical analysis in order to verify 
the importance of the above mentioned control vari-
able of productivity and governance within industri-
al companies listed in European Union’s stock ex-
changes. Finally, the last section sketches some 
concluding remarks and some suggestions for future 
research agenda. 
1. Data 
Our study takes into consideration 8,0641 industrial 
companies listed in one of the stock exchanges of 
the European Union from the 1st January 1996 until 
the end of December 2008. Data concerning the 
name of the listed companies have been manually 
collected from end-of-year annual reports, published 
by the institutions responsible for the organization 
and management of the different stock exchanges. 
We decided to drop out from the sample all finan-
cial companies2 because of the peculiarities of their 
balance sheet and the poor comparability with in-
dustrial companies’ indices. In addition, the research 
considers only firms characterized by a statutory 
prevision of “one share  one vote” (Harris and 
Raviv, 1988) and the ones with completely available 
balance-sheet data. Therefore, our database is finally 
composed by 5,213 industrial listed companies, 
belonging to twenty-two countries3 (over the twenty-
seven member of the European Union). We provide 
some macroeconomic and financial statistical descrip-
tions of our database. In the examined years, the coun-
tries of the sample were characterized by the following 
relative dynamic of Gross Domestic Product. 
                                                     
1 8,064 is the total number of industrial companies listed in the stock 
exchange of European Union between 1996 and 2008. 
2 Banks, Insurance and General financial companies, as classified by 
Thomson Datastream. 
3 The countries are the following: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden. As we can note from 
Tables 1 and 2, for our analysis we dropped five of the twenty-seven 
member of the European Union: Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria and Latvia due 
to lack of data; the United Kingdom for its impartiality with respect to 
the overall European Union’s economic and institutional policy.
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Table 1. Relative weight of the national Gross Domestic Product 
Country '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 MEAN
Euro area
Austria 2.88 2.81 2.80 2.78 2.75 2.69 2.67 2.65 2.64 2.65 2.64 2.64 2.66 2.71
Belgium 3.38 3.39 3.37 3.34 3.33 3.28 3.27 3.26 3.28 3.29 3.29 3.27 3.24 3.31
Finland 1.59 1.65 1.72 1.72 1.75 1.77 1.76 1.73 1.73 1.71 1.72 1.75 1.74 1.72
France 19.6 19.4 19.4 19.2 19.1 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.8 18.8 18.6 18.5 18.4 18.98
Germany 30.0 29.3 28.9 28.8 27.3 26.8 26.1 25.7 25.1 24.4 23.9 23.7 23.5 26.39
Greece 1.54 1.63 1.70 1.73 1.80 1.86 1.91 2.03 2.11 2.15 2.20 2.23 2.29 1.94
Ireland 0.94 1.04 1.15 1.27 1.39 1.48 1.59 1.66 1.69 1.76 1.82 1.85 1.71 1.49
Italy 16.1 16.1 16.0 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.6 15.3 15.1 14.8 15.68
Luxembourg 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.30
Netherlands 5.12 5.24 5.32 5.43 5.53 5.67 5.68 5.66 5.58 5.59 5.57 5.55 5.62 5.50
Portugal 1.45 1.50 1.56 1.60 1.62 1.64 1.65 1.64 1.64 1.62 1.60 1.59 1.57 1.59
Slovakia 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.47
Slovenia 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.27
Spain 7.58 7.72 7.92 8.15 8.35 8.62 8.90 9.29 9.56 9.89 10.1 10.3 10.3 8.97
Non euro area
Czech Republic 0.70 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.98 0.96 1.00 1.09 1.17 1.24 1.40 0.97
Denmark 2.30 2.29 2.29 2.29 2.30 2.27 2.25 2.24 2.24 2.26 2.25 2.21 2.19 2.26
Estonia 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.10
Hungary 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.69 0.75 0.86 0.88 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.80
Lithuania 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.20
Poland 1.71 1.98 2.04 2.21 2.46 2.69 2.56 2.27 2.32 2.66 2.81 3.03 3.41 2.47
Romania 0.05 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.30 0.42 0.52 0.65 0.78 0.88 1.01 1.21 1.29 0.58
Sweden 3.50 3.40 3.15 3.39 3.53 3.18 3.23 3.27 3.27 3.21 3.23 3.23 3.10 3.28
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Euro area 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.89
Non euro area 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data. 
France, Belgium, Austria and Scandinavian countries 
show a stable relative weight of their GDP compared 
to the GDP of the other analyzed countries; on the 
contrary, Poland and Spain register a substantial 
growth of this ratio. All countries with a small impact, 
in 1996, of their GDP over the total area GDP, register 
high relative rates of growth of GDP weight, albeit 
with different absolute significance. On the other hand, 
Germany and Italy show a reduction of their weight, 
even if with a different percentage of decreasing. If we 
consider similar evidence in terms of market capitali-
zation, we obtain the following results. 
Table 2. Relative weight of the market capitalization of each national stock exchange 
Country '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 MEAN
Euro area
Austria 1.2 1.04 0.72 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.83 1.01 1.3 1.75 1.97 1.95 1.27 1.12
Belgium 4.24 4.01 5.15 1.6 2.96 3.08 3.63 3.18 4.13 4.05 4.08 3.3 2.93 3.69
Finland 2.23 2.14 3.24 5.59 4.96 4.06 3.63 3.12 2.77 2.94 2.73 3.15 2.7 3.33
France 20.9 19.7 20.8 23.6 24.4 25 25.2 24.8 23.5 24.7 25 23.7 26.1 23.66
Germany 23.7 24.1 22.9 22.9 21.4 22.8 18 19.8 18 17.1 16.8 17.9 19.4 20.4
Greece 0.85 1 1.68 3.27 1.87 1.84 1.8 1.96 1.89 2.04 2.14 2.26 1.58 1.87
Ireland 1.23 1.44 1.4 1.1 1.38 1.6 1.58 1.56 1.72 1.6 1.68 1.23 0.87 1.41
Italy 9.12 10.1 11.9 11.6 12.8 11.2 12.5 11.2 11.9 11.2 10.6 9.16 9.12 10.99
Luxembourg 1.16 0.99 0.74 0.58 0.57 0.51 0.65 0.68 0.76 0.72 0.63 1.42 1.16 0.8
Netherlands 13.4 13.7 12.6 11.1 10.81 9.76 10.48 8.95 8.13 8.32 8.02 8.17 6.8 10.03
Portugal 0.87 1.14 1.32 1.06 1.02 0.99 1.12 1.07 1.06 0.94 1.07 1.13 1.2 1.08
Slovenia 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.25 0.21 0.1
Slovakia 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.01
Spain 8.58 8.49 8.43 6.91 8.51 9.98 12.14 13.31 14.2 13.48 13.62 15.37 16.57 11.51
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Table 2(cont.). Relative weight of the market capitalization of each national stock exchange 
Country '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 MEAN
Non euro area
Czech Republic 0.64 0.37 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.2 0.42 0.32 0.47 0.54 0.5 0.63 0.86 0.43
Denmark 2.53 2.74 2.07 1.68 1.82 1.88 2.01 2.23 2.29 2.5 2.38 2.37 2.3 2.3
Estonia 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.1
Hungary 0.19 0.44 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.34 0.31 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.33 0.33
Lithuania 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.6 0.1 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.06 0.1
Poland 0.3 0.35 0.43 0.47 0.53 0.55 0.75 0.68 1.07 1.32 1.53 1.77 1.58 0.87
Romania 0 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.1 0.18 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.35 0.1
Sweden 8.74 7.98 5.84 5.97 5.54 5.04 4.68 5.31 5.69 5.67 5.9 5.23 4.42 5.85
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Euro area 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90
Non euro area 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data. 
If we consider the weight of the ratio of single coun-
try market capitalization on the market capitalization 
of the whole sample, we do find the following evi-
dence: the relative weight of the market capitalization 
of German, Swedish and Dutch stock exchanges 
drops significantly, while it is possible to verify a 
substantial growth of the relative weight for the Span-
ish financial market; all the remaining countries 
show a stable weight of their market capitalization. 
2. Estimation strategy 
The aim of the paper is the identification of the de-
terminants of the stock returns of the sample 
through regression analyses. In a first instance, the 
analysis is implemented for the whole sample, while 
in the second part, it is focused on a smaller group 
of firms. The companies of the latter sub sample 
obtained ranking the firms of the entire population 
based on their market capitalization and selecting 
the companies to reach 80% of total market capitali-
zation. The model is specified as follows: 
yit =  + x’it  + it ,
where i represents the i-th company in the sample in 
the year of observation t. The dependent variable yit
indicates the annual investment return of the stock 
for the i-th company in year t and the regressors are 
included in the vector of observations x'it;  is the 
intercept, while the vector of  coefficients meas-
ures the impact of each regressor on the expected 
value of the dependent variable and is obtained by 
the method of ordinary least squares. Concerning 
the error term ( it) distribution, we relax the assump-
tion of its independence across t, allowing the clus-
tering of observations corresponding to a given firm. 
Consequently, we assume that the error term is i.i.d. 
across firms but not necessarily for different obser-
vations within the same company. All reported stan-
dard errors are adjusted for clustering (Huber, 1967; 
White, 1980). This procedure enhances the robust-
ness of our findings and allows us to take into ac-
count the panel data structure of our sample. 
According to Fama and French (1992, 1993) and the 
other previously mentioned studies, the variables 
considered as regressors of our analysis are the mar-
ket capitalization, the trade openness, the market 
risk premium, a Corporate Productivity Index and 
the average of the series of Countries’ Governance 
Indices (Bellavite Pellegrini, 2008). In addition, in 
this survey we control for the effect of two addition-
al firm specific variables: the leverage and the vola-
tility of stock prices. These last indices appear suit-
able proxies to identify the financial risk of the dif-
ferent companies, useful to check the robustness of 
the effects of Corporate Productivity and Country 
Governance Indices. Finally, we introduce sectoral 
and year dummies, whose coefficients are omitted in 
the tables. This subsection briefly describes these 
variables and their database source. 
The annual total investment return1 of each compa-
ny (our dependent variable) represents the annual 
return index of a public traded company. It tracks 
down both the capital gains of the stock over time, 
and any cash distribution, such as dividends, assum-
ing that the latter ones are reinvested back into the 
company. It displays a more accurate representation 
of the stock returns. 
We use the following ones as independent variables:  
1. Country governance index. 
2. Leverage.
3. Market capitalization. 
4. Market risk premium. 
5. Price volatility. 
6. Corporate productivity index. 
7. The trade openness. 
                                                     
1 Nomenclature in Thomson Financial Datastream: total return index. 
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The governance index1 is represented by the Index 
of Economic Freedom, elaborated by The Heritage 
Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. It meas-
ures the degree of economic freedom in the world 
nations for each year. This index is calculated as 
the average of 10 components of economic free-
dom: Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal 
Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary Free-
dom, Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, 
Property Rights, Freedom from Corruption and 
Labor Freedom. The leverage has been computed 
as the ratio of the total debt to the total capital and 
for this reason can be considered as an indicator of 
the financial risk of the analyzed companies; in 
addition, the link between leverage and stock re-
turns is underlined in literature (Penman et al., 
2007). The market capitalization2 represents the 
market value (in euro) of the companies’ overall 
outstanding shares. It is calculated multiplying the 
number of outstanding shares of a company by the 
market price of one share at the end of each year; 
in the regression analysis, we include the natural 
logarithm of this variable as in several governance 
studies in order to improve the fit of the model. 
The relationship between the outcome of interest 
and the market capitalization is often non linear; an 
increase of market capitalization starting from low 
levels produce more relevant than an equal in-
crease at the highest quantiles. The market risk 
premium3 is another well-known and suitable indi-
cator for the prediction of investment returns (Fa-
ma and French, 1992; Kent and Titman, 1997); it is 
the difference between the return on a market port-
folio and on a risk-free asset. Because of the diffi-
culty to find an index for European stock ex-
changes before 2000, the market risk premium of 
the period of 1996-1999 has been calculated each 
year as the difference between the return on each 
country’s market portfolio and the 10-year gov-
ernment bonds return. Afterwards, this difference 
has been weighed by the mean between the relative 
weight of the national GDP and the national stock 
exchange market capitalization one. With respect 
to the period of 2000-2008 the market risk pre-
mium has been calculated as the difference be-
tween the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
Euro Index (MSCI EMU)4 and the European Cen-
                                                     
1 Nomenclature in our econometric model: country governance index.  
2 Nomenclature in the econometric model: market capitalization; data 
taken from Thomson Financial Datastream. 
3 Nomenclature in the econometric model: market premium. 
4 The MSCI EMU Index measures the performance of stocks of 11 
developed-markets based in the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU): Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The index contains 
almost 300 stocks and represents about 85% of the market capitalization 
in these countries. 
tral Bank (BCE) interest rate. The price volatility 
represents the measure of a stock average annual 
price movement to a high and low from a mean 
price for each year and is a key variable in explain-
ing firms stock return in literature (see Duffee, 
1995). The expected value of the volatility coeffi-
cients is negative, because higher variability of 
price per share of a stock company implies the 
need of a high risk premium in stock returns. The 
Corporate Productivity Index5 represents the ability 
of the companies to generate revenues given the 
number of employees, and it is calculated as the 
ratio between annual revenues and the number of 
firm employees: literature gives several solutions 
for computing productivity index. In our frame-
work, we decide to compute a productivity index 
applying at corporate level the approach of Free-
man (2008). Following Dellas et al. (2005), we 
finally introduced a trade openness indicator as a 
control variable in determining the stock returns. 
Trade openness is the sum of a country’s exports 
and imports divided by GDP and is obtained from 
the Penn World Table (PWT), which is the most 
widely used source for cross-country comparisons 
for the level and growth rate of macroeconomic 
variables. 
In the empirical model, sectoral dummies and year 
dummies are also introduced in order to protect 
estimates from the effect of omitted variables and of 
exogenous shocks, due to the recent economic crisis 
dating back to 2008. 
The decision to adopt a parsimonious model for the 
regression analysis is required by the need to avoid 
the bias due to the collinearity that is common when 
several accounting and financial variables are intro-
duced in the model. Indeed, many accounting indic-
es are built using strongly connected variables, such 
as total assets, total debts and revenues. The choice 
to include only two variables that deals with the 
balance-sheet of a firm (leverage and productivity 
that are uncorrelated) produce more reliable ad ro-
bust estimates6.
3. Empirical results 
After the definition of the different variables consi-
dered as regressors, we want to measure if the above 
mentioned explanatory variables are statistically 
significant, with positive or negative effect for the 
determination of stock returns. 
                                                     
5 Nomenclature in the econometric model: productivity index; data have 
been taken from Thomson Financial Datastream. 
6 In order to check for the low collinearity among explanatory variables, 
look at the correlation matrix placed in the Appendix. 
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Table 3. Total annual investment return for the 
whole sample (1996-2008) 
 Coefficient T stat.
Country Governance Index -.0046 -2.83***
Leverage -.0001 -1.79*
Logarithm of market 
capitalization 
.0299 5.21*** 
Market premium .9760 10.01***
Price volatility .0047 3.74***
Corporate Productivity Index .0001 2.42**
Trade openness .0007 2.77***
Intercept -.1680 -1.39
R2 .07 
Number of observations 23066 
F stat. 143.38*** 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s elaborations using Stata. 
All the independent variables considered above influ-
ence the total investment return and their coefficients 
are statistically significant. The limited variance ex-
plained by the regression sum of squares has to be 
ascribed to two reasons: the first one can be found in 
the nature of the analyzed regressors, different from 
the usual ones considered by the literature following 
the Fama and French models and which have shown 
good performance in the ability to explain the va-
riance. The second reason is related with the decision 
to proceed with an analysis of the whole sample as a 
single portfolio, without splitting the sample into 
groups of more homogeneous companies. This work 
has been done in our latter model, when we consider 
only the sub sample of the biggest firms that 
represent the 80% of total market capitalization of the 
European Union between 1996 and 2008. 
The coefficients of the governance and leverage 
present a negative effect on the total annual invest-
ment return. Both results, as the price volatility, are 
in line with the risk-return theory. Indeed, countries 
characterized by a better governance (higher gover-
nance index) appear more stable and their invest-
ments are less volatile. Consequently, less risky 
investments, analyzed in the long run, like in our 
analysis, offer more stable returns, even if their 
magnitude is lower. The same consideration can be 
done with the volatility index: more volatile invest-
ments compensate the risk with large return1.
Another measure of risk, more specifically a meas-
ure of the company’s financial risk, is represented 
by the leverage. This ratio appears particularly use-
ful to capture the industrial companies that have 
been penalized mostly during the current crisis. 
                                                     
1 This evidence is true only in the long run: if the analyzed period is 
short enough to consider a recessive period, less riskier assets will offer 
higher returns, compared to more riskier assets. 
Indeed, after the subprime bubble burst and the follow-
ing financial crisis the vast majority of the speculative 
attacks on the stock markets has been addressed to 
firms characterized by a higher leverage. These com-
panies, appearing riskier and having to refinance their 
debt at growing spreads, were deeply penalized and 
this explains why the total annual investment returns 
present a negative relation with the leverage ratio. 
The coefficients of market capitalization and market 
risk premium are statistically significant and posi-
tively correlated with the return yield. Furthermore, 
the ratio of the total revenues to the number of em-
ployees, taken as a proxy of productivity, shows a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient, al-
though its size is small, coherently with the results 
from Bellavite Pellegrini (2008) that used the ratio of 
revenues to working capital as a proxy of productivity. 
Finally, the sign of the coefficient for the openness to 
trade shows evidence that best companies in terms of 
stock returns come from countries characterized by a 
greater volume of imports and exports over the GDP. 
Our results confirm the importance of macroeco-
nomic variables in determining the status of returns, 
but also point out that productivity and governance 
are a source of “second best” conditions (Arnone, 
Bellavite Pellegrini and Graziadei, 2006) of some 
relief. This evidence raises some doubts as to what 
is the size of the link between management incentives 
and company performances directly attributable to 
management decisions, and to whether the mana-
gerial incentives are based on the control variables 
and not on those that come from their activity. 
We focus now on the sub sample of the big compa-
nies representing the top 80% of market capitaliza-
tion for European Union between 1996-2008. The 
results are reported in Table 4. 
Table 4. Total annual investment return for top 80% 
companies for market capitalization (1996-2008) 
Coefficient T stat.
Country Governance Index -.0032 -1.45
Leverage -.0008 -1.88*
Logarithm of market 
capitalization 
.0615 7.23*** 
Market premium .6849 6.68***
Price volatility .0037 3.37***
Corporate Productivity 
Index 
.0001 1.67* 
Trade openness .0007 1.75*
Intercept -.5726 -3.08***
R2 .31 
Number of observations 2671 
F stat. 23.11*** 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s elaborations using Stata. 
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The explained variance of this second model is 
slightly better than the one in the previous model, 
while the coefficients continue to have the same 
signs and dimensions quite similar to those seen in 
Table 3. In particular, the impact of price volatility, 
maintain a value close to that displayed in Table 3. 
The market premium coefficient decreases from 
0.98 to 0.68, preserving the sign of the first model 
and showing size similar to that found in literature 
(Bellavite Pellegrini, 2008). Leverage slightly in-
creases its negative effect for the sub-set of big 
companies. 
The only difference with respect to the model in 
Table 3 concerns the loss of significance of Gover-
nance Index. However, the result is not surprising 
for two reasons: first, we remark that in Table 4 we 
have stratified the sample based on the level of capi-
talization, and we dropped the largest number of 
observations falling in the first quintile. The level of 
significance is a function of the sample size, and it 
is obvious to observe a general decrease in p-values. 
Second, the inclusion of countries belonging to Eu-
ropean union but not adopting the euro as its curren-
cy may produce bias estimates for the impact of 
Country Governance Index on stock returns, due to 
strong existing differences in market regulation. 
Hence, Table 5 offers the regression results for total 
investment results restricted to the big companies 
belonging to Euro area representing 80% of total 
market capitalization. 
Table 5. Total annual investment return for top 80% 
companies for market capitalization in Euro area 
(1996-2008) 
 Coefficient T stat.
Country Governance Index -.0040 -1.71*
Leverage -.0007 -1.81*
Logarithm of market 
capitalization 
.0601 6.67*** 
Market premium .7015 6.22***
Price volatility .0055 3.49***
Corporate Productivity 
Index 
.0001 1.81* 
Trade openness .0007 1.56
Intercept -.5470 -2.78***
R2 .31 
Number of observations 2341 
F stat. 19.66*** 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s elaborations using Stata. 
As in Table 5, all the explanatory variables appear 
significant except for trade openness that has not 
effect on stock returns. However, the loss of signi-
ficance of trade openness is expected, because in 
Table 5 we consider only countries belonging to 
Euro area, where the presence of a single market 
does not affect trade among member countries. 
Looking at the coefficients of the risk factors, such 
as the price volatility, the market risk premium and the 
Country Governance Index, we confirm results from 
previous regressions: the higher is the risk at a firm 
level (underlined by the inverse relationship between 
stock returns and volatility) the greater is the ex-
pected total investment return required as a risk pre-
mium. Analogous conclusions derive from the positive 
relationship between stock returns and the market 
premium, according to Fama and French approach. 
The innovative contribution of the empirical results 
from this paper concerns with the introduction of a 
systemic risk factor measured at a country level: the 
Country Governance Index. Coherently with the 
theory of the relationship between the market risk and 
stock joint companies returns, the sign of the coeffi-
cient confirms that the relationship between the total 
investment returns and a risk factor, although meas-
ured at a macro level, is significant and inverse. 
In addition, we establish a correlation between the 
leverage and the stock returns: more in details, the 
worse is the company’s debt the lower are the 
operative performances. In this framework, the neg-
ative relationship between the leverage and the 
stock returns does not surprise. 
Focusing on the Corporate Productivity Index, 
which is the other innovative regressor introduced in 
the analysis, we discover a positive and significant 
impact on total investment returns. The size of the 
coefficient is low but this result is devalued by the 
dimensions of the dependent and the explanatory 
variables. In particular, productivity index has been 
built using the ratio of total revenues to the number 
of employees that is a small number compared to 
the numerator of the fraction. 
The results of productivity are mirrored by that of 
leverage: the better the operative performances of a 
firm the greater is the stock return. With respect to 
the market capitalization the results from previous 
tables are confirmed. 
Conclusion 
This study refers to the literature of asset pricing 
arising from the Fama and French approach (1992, 
1993, 1995 and 1996), adding control variables at 
firm level, like leverage and Corporate Productivity 
Index and macro control variables such as Country 
Governance Index and openness to trade. Even if 
Corporate Productivity Index and Country Gover-
nance Index represent second best conditions (Arno-
ne, Bellavite Pellegrini, Graziadei, 2006), they appear 
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to be useful for measuring the effect of the impact of 
a specific control variable on total annual invest-
ment returns. Our study considers an innovative 
database of observations, focusing its attention on 
European data of different countries. The construc-
tion of the database implicitly considers the Euro-
pean Union, and the Euro area in particular, as an 
increasingly integrated economical and only partial-
ly political block of countries. In this framework, 
the relevance of specific control variables like a 
Corporate Productivity Index (Parhizgari and Ab-
urachis, 2003) and a Country Governance Index 
(Gompers et al., 2003; Doidge et al., 2007) on total 
annual investment return of the listed industrial 
companies belonging to European Union between 
1996 and 2008 strongly emerges from data analysis: 
both indices clearly affect the performance of the 
total annual investment return of the sampled firms, 
the former with a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect and the latter with the opposite magnitude 
with clearer emphasis in Euro area. The analysis of 
the data of European countries as a progressively 
integrated economical and political area consequent-
ly introduces new blood in corporate finance re-
search in comparison to studies from the US firms. 
Moreover, the introduction of control variables in 
the Fama and French models allows us for measur-
ing the impact of institutional and macroeconomic 
variables, opening the path to new emerging issues 
in asset pricing. 
A future agenda of research may take into analy-
sis different issues. New control variables may be 
added in the analysis, in order to measure their im-
pact on total investment returns, using for example 
corruption indices. Moreover, the study may be 
extended to the financial sectors of the same Euro-
pean countries, consider some additional years like 
those following the Great Recession ranging from 
2008 to 2010. 
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Appendix
Table 1A. Correlation matrix for the explanatory variables 
 Governance index Leverage Log (market cap.) Market premium Price volatility Productivity index Trade openness
Governance index 1.0000  
Leverage -0.0115 1.0000 
Log (market cap.) 0.0397 -0.0096 1.0000
Market premium -0.1200 -0.0015 0.0682 1.0000
Price volatility -0.1484 0.0278 -0.1615 -0.0703 1.0000
Productivity index 0.0122 -0.0027 0.0014 -0.0138 -0.0749 1.0000 
Trade openness 0.6405 -0.0121 0.0251 -0.0910 -0.1951 0.0738 1.0000
